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Much of natural resource economics is devoted to analyzing
three classic management regimes: open access, common prop-
erty, and private ownership. Early theoretical work laid the
basis for these categories (Cheung, 1970; Faustmann, 1849;
Gordon, 1954) highlighting the implications of these institu-
tional settings for generating the full potential value of the nat-
ural resource, that is, for recovering resource rent.
Comparison of institutions and various measures of their rel-
ative performance is common, but empirical quantiﬁcation of
how well communities recover resource rent in each setting is
seemingly absent for resources other than ﬁsheries (e.g., Sinan
&Whitmarsh, 2010). Yet this is the fundamental issue we must
address to understand how well wild resources are managed.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on nat-
ural resource management and institutional choice. First, we
develop a method to empirically evaluate resource rent recov-
ery for a class of nontimber forest products (NTFPs). This
class includes species of mushrooms, fruits, nuts, berries, bam-
boo, and medicinal plants, which we refer to collectively as
“wild harvestable ﬂora” (WHF), and is likely the largest and
most important group of wild harvested species in developing
regions of the world. NTFPs provide livelihood support for
around one fourth of the world’s population (Food and Agri-
culture Organization, 2008), making their harvest dramatically
underexplored in the natural resource economics and bioeco-
nomic literature. Second, we construct a unique dataset
through original ﬁeldwork and apply the method for evaluat-
ing rent recovery to the harvest of wild matsutake mushrooms
in rural southwestern China. In these cases, bridging bioeco-
nomic theory and community-level empirics requires careful
consideration of the larger socio-economic context.120We are able to make these empirical and methodological
contributions for several reasons. First, we investigate a situa-
tion in which all three classic management regimes exist in a
similar setting for a single resource, the matsutake mushroom
harvested from villages in Yunnan, China. Second, the bioeco-
nomics of our class of NTFPs allow us to empirically estimate
a feasible index for resource rent, as we will discuss in depth
below. This index relies on two features of WHF. First, bio-
logical growth or productivity is not impacted by harvests
and, second, markets pay more for mature products. Our
index calculates the proportion of the maximum attainable
revenue a harvesting system recovers.
This study also provides practical insight for development
practitioners. Resource management institutions are often
promoted as a win–win solution for local livelihoods and the
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ture that stresses the need for clear “rules of use” for sustain-
able local management (Berkes, 1989; Klooster, 2000).
Projects that help communities develop such rules fundamen-
tally assume communities without resource management insti-
tutions squander the potential value of their resources, value
that could otherwise be captured to improve rural livelihoods.
That is, when rules are absent, resource use is assumed unsus-
tainable or otherwise wasteful. This research questions these
assumptions and may help clarify why many projects that in-
tend to foster community-based management are unsuccessful
(Blaikie, 2006; Larson & Soto, 2008; Leach, Mearns, & Sco-
ones, 1999; Morrow & Hull, 1996; Songorwa, 1999). Decades
of research emphasize that context matters for successful col-
lective action (Bromley, 1992; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990;
Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010), and here we provide evi-
dence that a lack of rules (res nullius) can also be a conscious
collective institutional choice based on local costs and beneﬁts
of developing, implementing, and enforcing regulations.
The next sections of the paper sketch out the bioeconomic
theory of WHF and explain how we calculate our index of re-
source rent. We then describe the setting, data, and methods
used in our empirical application. After presenting results
from our empirical cases we explore hypotheses for villages’
choice of management institutions. The ﬁnal section concludes
with a summary of our ﬁndings, a discussion of the endogene-
ity of institutional choice and resource endowments, and a
reﬂection on the classic resource harvest model.
2. BIOECONOMICS OF WILD HARVESTABLE FLORA
The bioeconomic open access harvest framework (Clark,
1990; Gordon, 1954) has been applied to NTFPs as a general
category (e.g., Gunatileke & Chakravorty, 2003; Lo´pez-Feld-
man, Mora, & Taylor, 2007; Robinson, Albers, & Williams,
2008). But the term “nontimber forest product” is rooted in
context, not biology, and refers to a variety of resources (Bel-
cher, 2003). Here we focus on a class of NTFPs we call wild
harvestable ﬂora (WHF), which includes species of fruits, ber-
ries, nuts, and mushrooms, among others. These NTFPs have
several features that cause resource rent to be positively corre-
lated with the average price of harvested units, as observed in
local markets. This result is not typical of other resources, and
implies that the ratio of the observed average price of an indi-
vidual to an expected “best” price is a measure of the relative
eﬃciency of the management regime. To get to this result re-
quires several steps, the details of which we discuss in this sec-
tion. Intuitively, these NTFPs grow quickly enough that it
should make sense for harvesters to only harvest mature spec-
imens. If there is no good reason to harvest early, then each
individual specimen has the potential to achieve its full poten-
tial price, and we use this potential price as a benchmark for
how well a harvest system performs.
Inmore detail, the ﬁrst relevant feature of theseNTFPs is that
they ripen ormaturewithin a harvest season, and price increases
in response, so harvesters can increase revenue by choosing to
postpone harvesting individual specimens. The decision to har-
vest a specimen is a decision problem weighing the beneﬁts and
costs of postponing harvest. The beneﬁt of postponement is
obvious—a higher price; the cost includes the cost of returning
to harvest and the possibility that another harvester will ﬁnd the
specimen and harvest it ﬁrst. Since age is positively correlated
with price and is thus fundamental to the harvesting decision-
making process, for this class of resources we must explicitly
consider age cohort dynamics. The Appendix presents a simple
mathematical treatment of the harvester’s decision problem.Second, and unlike many renewable resources such as ﬁsher-
ies, harvests of this class of NTFPs have little impact on the
stock’s rate of reproduction, so that the stock available in the
future is eﬀectively independent of the current harvest rate.
Certainly if harvested rates are high enough, the population’s
reproductive capacity can be compromised since disturbance
of any part of the life cycle of a species has an impact on future
production (Peters, 1994). However, harvests of fruits, seeds,
nuts, bamboo, and mushrooms can be sustained at very high
rates without appreciably aﬀecting the communities’ popula-
tion structure. Ticktin (2004) reviews population dynamic
studies of the impact of fruit and seed harvests, which estimate
sustainable harvest rates of 80-93% depending on the species.
Emanuel, Shackleton, and Baxter (2005) estimate 92% of mar-
ula fruit can be harvested without impacting the population
proﬁle of marula trees. A multi-decade study of mushroom
harvests shows fruiting is closely correlated with climactic fac-
tors, but not harvest rates (Straatsma, Ayer, & Egli, 2001), and
a publication from an updated version of this dataset is even
titled “Mushroom picking does not impair future harvests”
(Egli, Peter, Buser, Stahel, & Ayer, 2006). Another decade-long
study shows similar results as long as harvesters do not unnec-
essarily disturb the soil during harvests (Luoma et al., 2006).
Thus while harvests by deﬁnition interfere with resources’ life
cycle, in most empirical settings we ﬁnd little evidence that nor-
mal harvests from this class of NTFPs has an appreciable im-
pact on the harvestable stock in following seasons. Therefore,
our theoretical argument here assumes harvest rates below
what might threaten the sustainability of the resource. But
these rates are quite high, with the available evidence showing
harvesters can remove at least 80% of the fruiting bodies or
propagules without adversely aﬀecting future production.
Empirically, this allows us to use the value of the best re-
sources observed in a community as a theoretical benchmark
for the maximum average revenue attainable per specimen,
which we cannot assume in the traditional case. For example,
consider a deer population where older males are most valuable
to hunters. Harvesting the maximum quantity of only large
bucks is not an optimal strategy due to inter-seasonal deer pop-
ulation dynamics (e.g., Jensen, 1996). Similarly, one would not
aim to only ﬁsh for older salmon since they have greater repro-
ductive capacity relative to younger ﬁsh (Forbes & Peterman,
1994). In these cases one must understand the resource’s
population dynamics to derive an optimal harvest strategy over
diﬀerent population cohorts. For our class of NTFPs, by
contrast, harvesting the greatest number of the most valuable
cohort is a rent-maximizing strategy that, in most empirical
cases, is also sustainable. Further, for the resources considered
here, a user cost only arises from harvesting individual
resources several days or weeks too early (an intra-seasonal ef-
fect), so we can eﬀectively ignore time discounting and focus on
current rents to understand a system’s eﬃciency.
A third feature of WHF, an assumption shared with the
standard model, is that marginal costs (eﬀort) monotonically
increase with increasing aggregate quantity harvested. As
community harvest eﬀort increases, search costs increase from
crowding and competition in the harvest labor force. That is,
ﬁnding greater quantities of resources means individual har-
vesters must spend more time ﬁnding the next unit of resource,
driving up the average search cost per unit resource. The goal
of management, as in the traditional resource model, is to limit
aggregate eﬀort in the harvest system.
Together these three features imply a particular relationship
with an empirical implication: The higher the average price per
unit received, the greater the current resource rent, and
the closer the value of harvests to its maximum value. The
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tunity to make ordinal comparisons between harvesting com-
munities at relatively low cost. All that is required is the
average unit price received by harvesters within each commu-
nity, which is a relatively easy piece of information to obtain.
This relationship between average price, current resource
rent, and the value of the resource is not generally true for
all renewable resources. Consider current-period harvests for
the usual “textbook” case, shown in panel (a) in Figure 1.
Prices are exogenous, so average revenue (AR), marginal rev-
enue (MR), and the per-unit price (P) are constant and equal
for all quantities (Q). Average and marginal harvest costs
(AHC and MHC) are initially constant with quantity until
harvest labor “saturates” the system such that harvests be-
come rival. As competition increases, ﬁnding a unit of biomass
takes more eﬀort. Therefore, the AHC and MHC of, say,
catching ﬁsh rise. Total marginal cost (MC) is the sum of
MHC and the marginal user cost (MUC), which is the oppor-
tunity cost of harvesting biomass today at the expense of let-
ting that biomass contribute to growth into the future, and
in the traditional model is a function of the growth of total
biomass. Here we distinguish between two sources of biomass
accumulation in the resource population: biomass accumula-
tion due to growth of individual organisms (i) and biomass
accumulation due to reproductive population growth (r) so
that MC = MHC + MUC(i,r). MUC is greater than 0 for
any Q greater than 0 since even for the ﬁrst unit harvest there
is a cost associated with giving up the value of an individual
organism’s future growth (MUC(i) > 0). In this classic model,
MUC(r) increases with quantity so the total MC curve slopes
upward even when MHC are constant. The harvest quantityFigure 1. Current-period harvests. Notes: AR = average revenue;
MR = marginal revenue; Q = harvest quantity; AHC = average harvest
costs; MHC = marginal harvest cost; MC = marginal cost; MUC = mar-
ginal user cost; i = individual component; r = reproductive component.
Note Q* is where MR = MC.that maximizes rent (Q*) is where MR equals MC. The thick
dashed gray line represents average rents (AR–AHC). Com-
plete dissipation of extra-normal resource proﬁts in the cur-
rent period occurs at harvest level Q0, where average harvest
cost (AHC) equals average revenue (AR).
In contrast to the textbook treatment, consider instead the
case for wild ﬂora with the characteristics described above,
shown in panel (b) of Figure 1. In this model, we separate
the per-unit price to reﬂect two resource cohorts: mature
and immature specimens (though the results apply generally
to multiple cohorts). Mature resources are sold at a per-unit
price PM, and immature resource at price PI. The optimal
strategy at low harvest quantities (relative to its population
size) is to take only mature fruit, in which case average and
marginal revenue are equal at the mature price PM. In this cur-
rent-period framework, to harvest higher quantities one must
begin to pick less valuable immature specimens, so marginal
and average revenue decrease. To harvest at higher quantity
levels, harvesters pick any specimen they ﬁnd. Average harvest
cost rises, as in the traditional model, perhaps in part because
the opportunity cost of harvest labor increases, 1 but mostly
we are thinking of the competition eﬀect described above.
The fact that current harvesting has no appreciable eﬀect on
future stock implies that marginal user cost is only a function
of individual growth: MUC(i). That is, the marginal user cost
is only the opportunity cost of harvesting an individual today
and forgoing the future net beneﬁts that could come from
allowing that specimen to grow to maturity, and is now di-
vorced from the reproductive potential of that specimen.
Again, this is an important distinction from the classic mod-
el—since harvests do not aﬀect the population’s reproductive
capacity (and therefore future productivity), we can focus on
current harvest and use the best specimens observed in a mar-
ket as a benchmark for the idealized best possible outcome.
In panel (b) the average resource rent, which is the diﬀerence
between average harvest cost and average revenue (AR–
AHC), is maximized at the harvest level Q*, where
MC = MR, and falls monotonically until it dissipates com-
pletely at Q0, where AHC = AR. Standard economic thinking
implies this is the relevant economic range of harvest. A single
owner of the resource would harvest at Q*, and regimes that
relax property rights over the resource invite excess eﬀort as
harvesters compete to capture rent.
As shown in panel (b) of Figure 1, a key feature of this class
of resources is that resource rent is monotonically related to
average revenue (average price), which is perhaps the most
readily available economic datum in the system. Because we
know the maximum average revenue attainable in the system
(the expected price of a high-quality specimen) we can judge
how eﬀectively a community captures resource rent by the pro-
portion of maximum revenue (PMR) captured in a system. We
discuss empirical calculation of PMR in the next section.
This is not the case in the classic model of renewable re-
source exploitation, in which, at a given stock level, average
revenue is equal to price, which is constant. Attempting in-
stead to develop an index based on costs is generally problem-
atic because rent is maximized where marginal cost is equal to
price, but calculating marginal cost requires calculating mar-
ginal harvest cost and marginal user cost, for which we must
understand the inter-seasonal dynamics of the system. To
make this point another way, consider the classic ﬁsheries
model. Two regimes with diﬀerent stock levels have diﬀerent
MHC and MUC and so comparing rent capture between the
two systems requires accurate knowledge of not only harvest
costs, but also the stock level and population dynamics of
the ﬁshery. The ceteris paribus implied by panel (b) in Figure 1
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fundamentals are the same across two regimes, simply because
the underlying stocks are diﬀerent. So compared to the case of
WHF, the classical case requires far more information to as-
sert the relative eﬃciency of the regime and even comparison
within the same ﬁshery over time becomes problematic.
In calculating the PMR from panel (b), we can use the obser-
vable average revenue as an index of eﬃciency since it is corre-
lated with rents, which relies on the fact that future stock is
not aﬀected by current harvests. Further, structural changes
in the system may aﬀect the absolute rents available, but a pro-
portional comparison still captures how well communities cap-
italize on their resource endowments given the prices they face.3. CALCULATING THE PROPORTION OF MAXIMUM
REVENUE (PMR)
We identify the eﬀectiveness of a harvest community by the
percent of potential revenue a system captures given the insti-
tutions it enforces. That is, if a community only harvests re-
sources that sell for the highest prices, it is said to capture
100% of the potential revenue available. If some specimens
are harvested that have not reached their optimal state, then
the revenue captured is less than its full potential.
To make observations across harvest communities compara-
ble, two main empirical issues must be addressed. First, re-
source productivity may vary geographically so that the
total quantity of resources harvested may vary between com-
munities. To normalize the magnitude of harvests we use the
empirical probability distribution of the harvested product’s
age so that the sum probability of observing any given age is
equal to one.
Second, prices may vary across communities. To control for
such variation one can normalize age-speciﬁc prices by the
maximum expected price within a harvest community and
then multiply the vector of age probability densities by the
normalized vector of associated age-speciﬁc prices. This gives
the proportion of the maximum revenue captured. Setting the
maximum expected price equal to one ensures that, when mul-
tiplied by the proportion of products sold at that price, the
maximum revenue that can be “achieved” is 100%. In this
way incentives for collecting various cohorts of resources with-
in a harvest community are preserved, but the proportion of
maximum revenue results in a measure of the harvest value that
is comparable across harvest communities.4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
The matsutake mushroom (Tricholoma matsutake) grows
wild in pine and oak forests in Yunnan, China, and has be-
come an important element of the local economy. Demand
for matsutake comes almost solely from Japan, where it is
highly prized for its iconic and medicinal properties. This re-
sults in farm gate prices that earn some villages 70% of their
annual cash income (He, 2003).
In this part of Yunnan, many villages have de jure commu-
nal rights over forest use (Rozelle, Huang, & Benziger, 2003;
Su, Zhao, Gan, Xu, & Ren, 2008; Weyerhaeuser, Kahrl, &
Yufang, 2006). These communal rights include the autonomy
to develop village-level rules for NTFP management (He,
2003; Salick, Yang, & Amend, 2005; Yeh, 2000). Since villages
have the explicit ability to self-monitor and enforce their own
rules of use, in this study we explicitly focus on de facto insti-
tutions practiced within each village. Some villages in the area
have gone through Forest Tenure Reform, a national policyinitiative through which households sign 30–70 year contracts
for use rights over forest plots (Xu & Jiang, 2009). Thus the
villages sampled in this study fall into one of three types of
matsutake management: open access (no matsutake-related
rules in their communal forest), common access (only village
members can harvest in their communal forest) and private ac-
cess (household-based use rights to forest plots).
Our data consist of harvest information from 13 rural vil-
lages in northwest Yunnan and includes 6,770 mushroom
observations and 256 household questionnaires. Descriptive
statistics for these villages are given in Table 1. Some have
nominal restrictions prohibiting the harvest of “small” mush-
rooms. In practice, however, most residents could not specify
what is meant by “small,” and we never observed enforcement
of this rule. Many villages have additional rules excluding live-
stock from forests, and against using pesticides or pesticide
bags to prevent contamination of matsutake, which is valued
for its natural and wild properties, but none of these were ob-
served to aﬀect harvesting decisions in practice. In the sample
of villages, most residents are Chinese ethnic minorities, with
about half being ethnically Tibetan.
Matsutake mushrooms are the fruiting body of an under-
ground network of mycelia (Allen, 1991; Hosford, Plitz, Moli-
na, & Amaranthus, 1997; Wang, Hall, & Evans, 1997), which
sprouts with the biological purpose of spore dispersal, but is
not a vital part of the organism as a whole. So picking the
mushroom is like picking fruit from a tree and, as noted
above, decade-long studies of such mushrooms, including
the American matsutake (Tricholoma magnivelare), show no
relationship between mushroom harvest rates and future fruit-
ing productivity (Egli et al., 2006; Luoma et al., 2006; Norvell,
1995; Straatsma et al., 2001). In relation to the bioeconomics
of WHF, this implies that matsutake satisfy the ﬁrst bioeco-
nomic criteria for WHF established above, that current har-
vest practices have no discernable impact on the future rate
of productivity of a mycelial colony. There are no biological
studies of matsutake fruiting rates or productivity speciﬁc to
our study sites, but Yang et al. (2008) present data on matsu-
take exports from the region over an eight-year period. During
this time export quantity varies dramatically despite increasing
or constant levels of collection eﬀort, thus showing no appar-
ent correlation between harvests and future productivity. This
at least gives us no reason to question that harvests of matsu-
take in Yunnan can be considered “normal.”
The second criterion dictates that rent dissipation occurs
from harvesting the resource too early. For matsutake we take
the size of the mushroom as a proxy for its age. Figure 2 shows
the average price for a given mushroom length over all mush-
rooms in our dataset showing, on average, higher prices are
paid for larger individual matsutake mushrooms. Addition-
ally, the bioeconomic theory presented above predicts that
open access systems harvest the smallest mushrooms, common
access forests harvest slightly larger mushrooms, and private
systems allow mushrooms to grow to their economic optimum
(see the Appendix for a mathematical argument). We will re-
turn to the third criterion, that costs increase with decreasing
revenues, at the end of the paper. Matsutake take ﬁve to eight
days to go from an immature to mature state, making time-
discounting irrelevant. 25. DATA & METHODS
(a) Village markets
Data were collected during the summer of 2008 and 2009 for
13 villages in northwestern Yunnan Province, China.
Table 1. Village descriptive information
Village name Institutional system Rules Pop density (ppl/km2) Elevation Nonresidents
Nonresid allowed?
Is there a fee?
# Nonresid/year
1. Gezan Common access Only village residents can pick,
cannot pick small ones (not
speciﬁc)
2–5 3,113 No
2. Haitangwa Private Nonharvest seasons no one can
enter matsutake forest; no
ﬁrewood, pine needles or
livestock in forest; don’t steal
matsutake; no ﬁres; no tourists;
contracts individually arranged
>50 3,250 No
3. Shanglehe Open access None >50 2,075 Yes 50–60
4. Xiagezan Common access Only village residents can pick,
no small ones (not speciﬁc)
2–5 3,230 No
5. Wengshui Common access Only village residents can pick,
no small ones (not speciﬁc)
2–5 3,255 Yes, few hundred
per person
A few
6. Jiangdong Common access Only village residents, no metal
to harvest, no pesticide bag to
cover matsutake, cannot harvest
<5 cm, no cows or cutting trees
in forest
6–9 1,968 Yes, few hundred
per person per year
10
7. Xinhua Contracted Forests contracted to families via
lottery system, groups randomly
assigned
>50 3,000 No
8. Bamei Open access None 2–4 2,490 Yes ?
9. Adong Common access,
rest day
Only village residents,
(voluntary) rest day on sunday,
no cows in forest
5–10 3,235 Yes, few hundred
per day
None
10. Miheimen Private/contracted Village forest contracted to
households
>50 2,548 No
11. Wujie Private Private household forest >50 2,400 No
12. Lizui Open access None (currently) 2–5 2,800 Yes 1 or 2
13. Jidi Common access Only village residents can pick,
no small ones (not speciﬁc)
5–15 3,400 No
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grades of quality with a per-weight price pg. While grades are
quality-based, smaller mushrooms are generally sorted into
lower grades while bigger mushrooms go to higher grades,
and most buyers separate mushrooms into two to four grades.
Markets observed had at a minimum two buyers and the largest
markets accommodate up to 20 buyers in formal seller stalls,
but the majority of village markets had four to eight buyers.
(b) Mushroom length distributions
We primarily use photographs of buyers’ mushroom pur-
chases as a sample of village harvests. From a ruler placed
on top of buyers’ mushroom baskets, we measure the length
x of fully visible mushrooms. A village sample of mushrooms
is ﬁrst binned into two-centimeter length bins c = {1 < x 6 3,
3 < x 6 5, . . ., q  2 < x 6 q}, where q is the maximum
length observed. Frequencies are then tabulated into a
grade-speciﬁc probability distribution. Within village v, the
probability that a mushroom in grade g is between length a
and b is Pvg½a 6 x 6 b ¼
R b
a fvgðxÞdx, where fvg(x) is the ob-
served length distribution within village v for mushroom grade
g. Call the vector of grade-speciﬁc frequencies in two-cm
length bins within a village fvg = {fvg,1, fvg,2, . . ., fvg,C}, where
C is the total number of length bins.
Buyers provided estimates of the total weight (kg) they pur-
chased in each grade, which ﬁeld staﬀ veriﬁed with rough esti-mates of an average weight per basket and by counting the
number of baskets for each grade. Summing the total weight
purchased in each grade gives an estimate of the relative pro-
portion of harvest in grade g which we denote as gvg. To make
our sample representative of a village’s total harvest distribu-
tion, we apply these proportions gvg as weights to the grade-
speciﬁc distributions fvg.
(c) Price data
The average price received for a mushroom is strongly cor-
related with its length (see Figure 2), showing the ﬁnancial
incentive for waiting to harvest mushrooms when they are old-
er. However, mushrooms are sold in price grades pg, and the
units for pg are RMB/kg, so we need an estimated weight of
each mushroom to determine its individual price. We pur-
chased mushrooms from several villages from which we mea-
sured mushrooms’ length, cap width, stem width, and weight
(n = 61). From this set of mushrooms we develop predictive
relationships between observable characteristics (length, cap
width and stem width) and a mushroom’s weight (R2 = 0.95,
see Table A.1.). From the photographs of buyers’ baskets,
we measured observable mushrooms’ length, cap width and
stem width (n = 1,674). Using the estimated regression coeﬃ-
cients from the purchased set of mushrooms, we predict the
weight of each mushroom observed in photographs and mul-
tiply it by the mushroom’s grade price to estimate the implied
Figure 2. Mushroom price-length relationship. Notes: Data averaged for each ½ cm mushroom length category. Data shown for categories with n > 3 (total
n = 6,770).
MANAGING WILD RESOURCES 125per-mushroom price. Observations are then separated by
grade g and a vector of the average price by grade-speciﬁc
length bin is calculated within each village, pvg = {pvg,1, pvg,2,
. . ., pvg,C}.
Since harvested quantities and, therefore, the magnitude of
revenues from productive villages are much greater than reve-
nues from low productivity villages, revenues are not directly
comparable. To develop a comparable metric across villages,
we divide the vector of grade-speciﬁc length bin prices in each
village by a common normalization factor to remove the eﬀect
of absolute prices on the data: epvg ¼ pvg=pnorm.
The normalization factor pnorm aims to remove the eﬀect
of the magnitude of price and allow us to compare villages’
ability to capitalize on the total available revenue in any gi-
ven harvest system. One obvious candidate for normaliza-
tion is (i) maximum mushroom price observed in the
village. Yet maximum prices are often outliers and may
produce spuriously low estimates for epvg. To ensure our
choice of pnorm is not signiﬁcantly biasing our results, we
compare three additional candidates for normalization that
aim to capture the expected price for a high-quality mush-
room within a village: (ii) the average of the highest 5% of
mushroom prices, (iii) the average price of all mushrooms
in the top grade, plus two standard deviations, and (iv)
the average of length-averaged prices for the top grade,
plus two standard deviations. 3
(d) Revenue distributions
We calculate total normalized revenue from mushroom
harvests by multiplying the grade-speciﬁc price and frequency
vectors by the appropriate grade weight, and then summing
all grade-speciﬁc vectors within a length bin. The vector of
a village’s normalized revenue estimates from each length-
bin is pv ¼ fpvg;1; pvg;2; . . . ; pvg;Cg ¼
PG
g¼1
½gvg  epvg  fvg; where G
is the total number of grades within a village. 4 The notation
here should be read as each element of pv is an element-wise
multiplication of the corresponding elements of epvg and fvg,
with each element pair multiplied by the scalar weight gvg.
All vector sums of epvg, fvg and gvg are less than or equal toone, so summing the values in pv gives the percent of total
realized harvest value in a village, 5 showing how well a vil-










½gvg  epvg  fvg: ð1Þ
Pv represents a village’s actual revenue as a percentage of its
total revenue potential. This is the PMR.
(e) Uncertainty
The main source of empirical uncertainty in our data is the
variance associated with the price paid for a “typical” mush-
room of length x. As matsutake grow, they can be damaged
from insects or develop esthetic ﬂaws, reducing the price buy-
ers are willing to pay for it. Thus there is uncertainty around
the value one can expect to receive for leaving a mushroom in
the ground to grow larger. To understand the magnitude of
this uncertainty, for each grade within each village we ﬁt price
observations in a length-bin to a lognormal distribution and
use the parameters to estimate the sample mean and 95% con-
ﬁdence intervals for bins with more than three observations. 6
Figure 3 shows the price variance exhibited in village 7 (Xin-
hua) as an example. Using the high and low within-bin price
estimate we compute high and low revenue estimates via Eq.
(1) for each normalization candidate.6. EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF CLASSIC MANAGE-
MENT REGIMES
(a) Village revenue comparisons
Figure 4 shows villages’ cumulative revenue distribution
from the elements of the vector pv based on the fourth normal-
ization candidate described above, the average of length-aver-
aged prices for the top mushroom grade plus two standard
deviations. The highlighted endpoint of each cumulative

















Figure 3. Price variance by mushroom length, Xinhua (village 7). Notes:
The variance from prices within length bins is used to develop upper and
lower price estimates from 95% conﬁdence intervals from a lognormal
distribution. The whiskers on the boxplots show the maximum and minimum
prices from within a length bin. The middle line shows the median price, with
upper and lower boxes representing the second and third quartile,
respectively.
126 WORLD DEVELOPMENTnue (PMR), which shows how well villages capitalize on the
prices they face. Of interest is comparing communities by their
choice in institutional management strategy. As theory pre-
dicts, private access villages (dark solid lines) generally best
realize the value of matsutake harvests, attaining 30–45% of
the maximum attainable revenue. But contrary to theoretical
prediction, the open access villages (light dotted lines) empiri-
cally out-perform all common access villages (dark dotted
lines) in our sample except one, village 9 (Adong), which em-
ploys weekly rest days.
As a simple “back of the envelope” calculation for how well
villages could do, Table 2 shows the potential increase in rev-
enue villages could expect to gain from having harvest out-
comes similar to those observed in private access villages
based on Figure 4. We use the average PMR from the top
three private villages and the PMR from the worst performingFigure 4. Cumulative revenue distribution for 13 villages by management type.
(Eq. (1)), the proportion of maximum revenue (PMR), and is given for each villa
lines) generally do the best at capturing the value of the prices they face. Surpris
villages (dashed lines) except for one common village (Adong, village 9) that empprivate access village to compute upper and lower bounds,
respectively, on what a village might expect to gain from better
management. The values in Table 2 are the ratio of the com-
parison “reference” PMR divided by the revenue for the vil-
lage, minus one. The ﬁve worst-performing villages, all
common access, could at least double their revenues and
some seem able to gain four- to ﬁve-fold increases in earnings
that are not currently captured. For some, namely the open ac-
cess villages, the potential gains from management are not as
great.
To ensure that the normalization factor is not driving these
results, we calculate the PMR based on the three other nor-
malization factors described above and plot how villages’ rank
order changes (Figure 5). Not surprisingly, changes in rank or-
der are greatest when the PMR measures are close, most nota-
bly for villages in the high and low clusters seen in Figure 4.
We also see that the normalization factor used to calculate
the results in Figure 4 (square marker) seems to be a moderate
choice of the four normalization candidates.
(b) Costs increase with decreasing revenues
From our household questionnaire we calculate the percent
of a village’s total household labor devoted to harvesting (total
village harvest hours/village’s total working hours) to estimate
a comparable metric of the opportunity cost of harvest labor,
with the assumption that higher relative opportunity costs lead
to less participation in harvesting. Harvest labor allocation in
private villages (18%) is less than open access (36%; pri-
vate < open, p = 0.12) and common access (50%; pri-
vate < common, p = 0.01) suggesting private villages’ net
proﬁts are likely greater than either open or common access
villages. From Table 3, labor is also strongly negatively corre-
lated with the PMR (r = 0.88) on the village level. Private
access villages seem to enjoy lower labor costs, but so do open
relative to common access villages. Therefore, it does not seem
likely that common access villages’ low PMR scores are
matched by similarly low labor costs, making proﬁts increase
with PMR, and our original assumption that revenue is a good
proxy for proﬁts is supported.PMR Vill #, (m) 
42.1% 2 (p) 
41.9% 7 (p)  
31.5% 3 (oa) 
30.8% 11 (p)  
29.4% 10 (p)  
27.5% 9 (c)  
25.3% 8 (oa)  
19.2% 12 (oa) 
13.5% 5 (c)  
12.5% 1 (c)  
12.5% 4 (c)  
8.6% 6 (c)  
6.8% 13 (c)  
 
Notes: The right-most endpoint of the cumulative revenue distribution is Pv
ge in the table to the right. The distributions show that private villages (solid
ingly, open access villages (dotted lines) perform better than common access
loys additional rules in combination with excluding outsiders from harvesting.
Table 2. The potential value of implementing institutions
Village Management type PMR (%) Expected increase in revenue [least—most gain (%)]
2. Haitang Private 42.1 Upper bound reference
7. Xinhua Private 41.9
3. Lehe Open 31.5 7–21
10. Miheimen Private 30.8 Upper bound reference
11. Wujie Private 29.4 Lower bound reference
9. Adong Common w/rules 27.5 7–39
8. Bamei Open 25.3 16–51
12. Lizui Open 19.2 53–99
5. Wengshui Common 13.5 119–185
1. Gezan Common 12.5 135–206
4. Xiagezan Common 12.5 136–206
6. Jiangdong Common 8.6 242–345
13. Jidi Common 6.8 332–462
Figure 5. Proportion of Max Revenue (PMR) for four normalization candidates by rank order. *Min and max log-normal 95% conﬁdence intervals from the
min and max normalization factor, respectively. Notes: Rank order changes for diﬀerent normalization candidates, but the lower and upper ends of the rank
order spectrum are consistent. The chart’s village labels on the right are correspond to the left-most normalization factor (maximum price, which result in the
minimum PMR values) so one can follow the connector-lines to the right to see how villages’ rank order changes with candidate. Rank orders are most likely to
change across normalization candidates for villages with similar PMR measures. Figure 4 uses the length-averaged price from grade 1 (the square here in
Figure 5) which is bound by all the other normalization factors.
MANAGING WILD RESOURCES 1277. WHY DO VILLAGES DIFFER?
Our empirical example shows that villages with no rules
(open access) generally capture more revenue than those that
limit forest entry to villagers (common access), opposite what
we expect from theory. Research on self-governed resource
management (Agrawal, 2001; Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom,
2000; Ostrom, 1990; Poteete et al., 2010) describes how institu-
tional outcomes are embedded in local social, economic, and
ecological conditions. Given the descriptive data in Table 3
and our experience in the ﬁeld, we now turn to four factors
that we think hold the most explanatory power for under-
standing villages’ institutional choice in the setting studied
here: limited entry, biological productivity, transaction costs
of rule enforcement, and institutional goals. Given the rela-
tively small number of villages in our dataset, these factors
are best viewed as hypotheses to explore in future research.
(a) Limited entry
One explanation for our results is that the open access cases
are simply de facto limited entry systems and therefore eﬀec-tively common access cases. Indeed, Table 1 shows that there
is relatively limited outside entry into most open access vil-
lages. In a setting of limited entry, we can think of the cost
of labor as discontinuous or sharply rising at the margin.
Average harvest costs (AHCoa) terminate short of average rev-
enue, with rents accruing to the community at Q0,oa. In the
context of the model described in panel (b) of Figure 1, we rep-
resent this in Figure 6 below.
(b) Biological productivity
When biological productivity is high, relative scarcity is
low, so institutions may not be necessary. No biological sur-
vey of matsutake exists for the region, so productivity is
unobservable. Our best proxies for productivity, the average
number of mushrooms harvested per week per household
and the average number of mushrooms harvested per har-
vester per hour, are endogenous since they are derived from
harvest estimates, which itself is impacted by competition.
Still, Table 3 shows that most common access villages enjoy
greater matsutake harvests both in terms of absolute number
of mushrooms per household and the average hourly rate of
Table 3. Village-level summary statistics
Management (village #) PMR (%) % Village labor to harvesting (%)* Index of mushrooms/hh/week Index of mushrooms/h Index of #
harvesters/hh
Private (2) 42 9 0.01 0.05 0.22
Private (7) 42 25 0.02 0.03 0.24
Private (10) 31 18 0.02 0.05 0.33
Private (11) 29 – 0.03 0.45 0.32
Open (3) 32 18 0.05 0.14 0.29
Open (8) 25 31 0.50 1.00 0.29
Open (12) 19 – 0.03 0.27 0.26
Common (9) 28 34 0.07 0.11 0.47
Common (5) 14 43 1.00 0.77 0.76
Common (1) 13 66 0.76 0.57 0.87
Common (4) 13 58 0.40 0.32 0.73
Common (6) 9 60 0.27 0.20 0.71
Common (13) 7 – 0.21 0.40 1.00
*Data are not available for villages sampled in the 2008 ﬁeld season.
128 WORLD DEVELOPMENTharvest. Harvesters in villages with seemingly high productiv-
ity can still earn high revenues, suggesting that as long as
earnings are greater than foregone opportunities, there may
not be enough of an incentive to develop proﬁt-maximizing
institutions.
Figure 6 also shows how the shape of the cost curve
(AHC1 versus AHC2) may inﬂuence the relationship between
PMR and the amount of rent available in a system. A verti-
cal shift in average harvest costs is not a primary concern
since PMR is a proportional measure, but factors that aﬀect
how quickly harvest costs rise with a harvested quantity may
have an impact on the lower bound of feasible PMR mea-
sures in a system. One such factor could be the density of re-
sources or the productivity of a resource system. The cost of
ﬁnding the next unit of resource may be less if, in our case, a
forest produces a greater quantity of mushrooms (AHC2 im-
plies greater productivity than AHC1). So while our index
tells us how close a village gets to their maximum revenue,
cost information would help us pin down the lower bound
of a village’s PMR, and therefore how far a village keepsFigure 6. Costs and Rent for Wild Harvestable Flora. Notes: The average
harvest cost curve from Figure 1 (AHC1) is now contrasted with an average
harvest cost curve for the case where labor is constrained (AHCoa), for
instance due to the opportunity cost of an additional unit of labor in a
geogrpahically remote area, and an average harvest cost curve for the case
where harvest costs are low (AHC2), for instance due to greater resource
productivity. These factors may aﬀect the lower bound on average revenue
(dark circles) relative to the maximum revenue (light circle), and may help
explain why some open access villages seem to perform relatively well
compared to the highly productive forests of common access villages. As in
Figure 1, Q* is deﬁned as the point where MR = MC.itself from the rent-dissipating equilibrium. Regardless, in
our case here common access villages are generally more pro-
ductive than open access villages and they perform worse,
making their absolute gains from implementing institutions
that much larger.(c) Transaction costs
A third factor aﬀecting institutional choice seems to be high
transaction costs for monitoring and enforcement. We have no
quantitative measure of transaction costs, but village leaders
provided detailed narratives of the institutional history of
the village. These give some indication of the relationship be-
tween villages’ past ability to monitor and enforce rules and
other contextual characteristics such as resources, forests,
and socio-demographics.
First, in some villages a number of complex rules were
implemented and later abandoned. For example, Jidi (com-
mon village 13) attempted rotating group harvests and rest
days, as detailed in other reports (He, 2003; Yang et al.,
2006, 2009). At the time of our data collection no such
rules were in place, reportedly due to the diﬃculties in
monitoring and enforcing adequate compliance of the rules.
Gezan (common village 1) and Xiagezan (common village
4) had a similarly poor experience after implementing rest
days.
Ambitious leadership seems to play a role in overcoming ini-
tial transaction costs related to developing and implementing
creative rules. For example, a village leader in Lizui (open ac-
cess village 11) spearheaded a village bidding process for
matsutake use rights in 2003. In this process, households
would submit bids for the percent of their own harvest revenue
they would be willing to give back to a village collective. The
highest household bids (around ﬁve bids were accepted) would
receive harvest rights for the year in exchange for their bid
amount paid to the rest of the villagers. With low matsutake
prices (in 2005), the village abandoned the bidding process
and it was never reinstated. There was not popular support
for bringing these rules back since harvesters from outside vil-
lages are suspected of picking the high quality mushrooms and
some residents were never happy with the revenue-sharing
scheme. In another case, Xinhua (private village 7), a village
leader initiated the private contract system in the early 1990s
where groups of four or so households are randomly assigned
together to harvest from a speciﬁc forest plot as a group. This
system, in contrast, is still intact.
MANAGING WILD RESOURCES 129Finally, privatization in Miheimen (private village 10), Wu-
jie (private village 11) and Haitangwa (private village 2) is the
result of an early wave of China’s Forest Tenure Reform pro-
gram in the 1980s, before the discovery of the value of matsu-
take. Dividing communal forest into household plots takes
time and technical resources, and can be contentious. Shang-
lehe (open access village 3) and a village group in Lizui (open
access village 12) were starting the process of Forest Tenure
Reform at the time of data collection.
Adong (common village 9) has also undergone Forest
Tenure Reform, but since its forest area is so large it has cho-
sen to maintain household rights only for trees, and not
NTFPs like matsutake. In Gezan, Xiagezan, Wengshui, and
Jidi (common villages 1, 4, 5 and 13, respectively) the size of
the forest was often cited as a reason for a lack of rules.
Exclusionary rules (at the household or group level) are gener-
ally impossible to monitor and enforce since their forests are
so large.
(d) Institutional goals
Finally, equitable access to resources seems to drive some
villages’ institutional choice. A harvester from Gezan (com-
mon village 1) describes why some communities may shun
the development of rules: We used to have two or three rest days
per week, but it was a little dangerous. People would spend too much
time in the forest on harvest days—especially the elderly and some-
times younger children. So we gave up those rules some years ago.
With rest days, harvesters feel pressure to utilize harvest
days as much as possible. In this case the village decided the
occupational risk resulting from this rule was not socially
acceptable. Other common and open access villages also
voiced reluctance to implement institutions that might put
some residents at a risk or competitive disadvantage. Commu-
nal access is seen as the most egalitarian way to distribute rev-
enues and, given the heterogeneous distribution of matsutake
in a forest, villagers assume more individualized rights will re-
sult in higher levels of inequality.
(e) Summary
In addition to the factors described above, other factors that
could plausibly aﬀect institutional choice include competitive
pressure (when competition for resources is high, there is
incentive to develop restrictions to manage that competition),
social capital (group cohesion and trust within a community
make development and enforcement of village rules easier)
and within-village opportunity costs (high opportunity costs
lead to low harvest participation, making institutions unneces-
sary). However, at least in our descriptive data and anecdotal
observations, these did not seem to be major driving factors in
our study villages.
Our goal in this section is to develop economic intuition for
villages’ institutional choice. Statistical tests for any of these
explanatory hypotheses are not reliable since our sample size
is relatively small. But, in summary, these factors seem to im-
ply several potential conclusions. First, high resource produc-
tivity in common access settings seem to make the presence of
complex rules (i.e., rules stronger than simply excluding out-
siders) less necessary. Leadership can help overcome initial
barriers to developing and implementing rules, but the costs
of monitoring and enforcing rules as determined by the re-
source base, land area, and social context seem to eventually
determine a village’s institutional outcomes. When a village’s
forest size is large (or population density low), monitoringand enforcing anything but the simplest of rules, like
exclusion of outsiders, has been generally unsuccessful.
Enforcing village boundaries seems to be the least costly op-
tion regarding enforcement and monitoring, so the poorest
performing villages undertake this rule at a minimum. Where
privatization of forests have been nationally mandated (but
also aided), only villages with relatively small amounts of
matsutake forest area apply their private use rights to matsu-
take, showing that costs for monitoring private plots are
high, despite the potential for higher revenues. Given villages’
institutional histories and the desire for rules to be fair and
equitable, open and common access are choices made by
communities, not the outcome of myopic communities with
illogically high discount rates.8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on
natural resource governance in developing countries. First,
we present an empirical comparison of resource rent cap-
ture for villages that have chosen various institutions to
manage their resources. We use a unique dataset that shows
how outcomes from classic management regimes may not
always empirically behave as predicted by theory. Second,
we develop an index for ordinally ranking how well villages
recover the value an important class of nontimber forest
products. This method takes into account diﬀerences in re-
source productivity and diﬀerences in price grades across
systems.
The methods developed here apply to a class of NTFPs with
unique characteristics, but these resources are vital for the live-
lihoods of many rural residents dwelling in and around forests.
Generalizing the ﬁndings of this study should be treated with
caution given the small number of villages in this study, but we
present a unique quantitative index of village management
that would allow for simple replication. Our medium-N sam-
ple size is also a strength. Qualitative work on common prop-
erty assessments focus on context and detail, but are often
diﬃcult to generalize. Some larger-N studies of resource sys-
tems are emerging (Gibson, Williams, & Ostrom, 2005; Per-
sha, Agrawal, & Chhatre, 2011; Van Laerhoven, 2010) but
these can sacriﬁce context for statistical power. This paper
provides a large enough sample size to suggest the results
are not spurious, but a manageable number of cases so we
can explore case-speciﬁc explanations for the observed behav-
ior.
In most textbook discussions of renewable resource sys-
tems, costs borne by those outside of a resources system
are typically not represented. For instance, when explaining
the gains in moving a ﬁshery from open access to eﬀort levels
under sole ownership or with individual transferable quotas,
the transaction costs of developing and monitoring such insti-
tutional change is not typically an integral part of the
accounting. However, a full-cost accounting of these issues,
including the impact of local labor availability (as we saw
above in the open access situation), needs to be explicitly ta-
ken into account when developing policy prescriptions. Full-
cost accounting to implement self-governing institutions
would include:
1. the change in harvest revenue with enforced institutions,
2. the change in harvest costs with enforced institutions,
and
3. the transaction costs of developing and enforcing those
institutions (the cost of organizing and developing rules
and the costs of monitoring and enforcement).
130 WORLD DEVELOPMENTHarvests under such “costly cooperation” have been ex-
plored in a theoretical context (McCarthy, Sadoulet, & de
Janvry, 2001), but these costs are not often recognized in many
aid and development programs. Moreover, there is little
empirical work that shows how ecological, geographic, and so-
cial factors might impact institutional transaction costs.
We assess the institutional eﬀect on harvest revenue (part
1) through a comparison of villages’ PMR in Section 6.
We ﬁnd that private access villages capture the most value
from their forest resources, but open access villages generally
outperform common access villages. Importantly, private for-
est plots in our study villages were developed before discov-
ery of the matsutake mushroom, so this institutional change
was not precipitated by matsutake productivity, although vil-
lages do have autonomy to decide whether those private
rights apply to NTFPs. In the system studied here, quantita-
tive estimation of the institutional eﬀect on harvest costs
(part 2) requires measuring aggregate labor changes. Cross-
village comparison of the percent of village labor devoted
to forest harvests shows that labor costs generally decrease
as village institutions are able to capture more resource rent
(measured as PMR). Finally, measuring the transactions
costs associated with resource management institutions (part
3) would account for time, resource, and social costs that
arise when developing, monitoring and enforcing an institu-
tion.
In the villages surveyed here, open access systems are a con-
scious choice by villages that have little harvest pressure on re-
source harvests. They have less labor participation and
capture more revenue than most common access villages,
and receive minimal outside entry into their forest. Enactingrules, even if only to restrict outsiders, would not have much
practical impact. Our interpretation is that open access areas
are open access only because there would be relatively little
gains from institutions. If there were demand for better-per-
forming institutions within the village, there would at a mini-
mum be a call for enforcement of village boundaries—the
least-cost tool available to village residents.
Common access systems, in contrast, seem to suﬀer from
an overabundance of forest and forest products. Table 2
shows that many common access systems could capture much
greater revenue from those resources, and institutional histo-
ries show rich experimentation with rules that try to capture
that revenue. But large forest areas impede monitoring and
enforcement of rules, and high resource productivity provides
an adequate level of income for residents, even though addi-
tional restrictions could dramatically increase proﬁts. Com-
mon access villages seem victim of an unfortunate economic
circumstance: a wealth of resources results in transactions
costs that are too high to capture much proﬁt from the sys-
tem. Importantly, however, villages’ endowment of land
and resources are to blame, not a lack of human understand-
ing of the resource system or a myopic focus on short-term
needs.
Empirically, this research underscores the importance of
understanding the context within which a natural resource
harvest strategy is embedded. Residents seem to have the abil-
ity to manage natural resources eﬃciently given the con-
straints they face. The evidence here suggests development
assistance should move from building management programs
to better understanding and relieving village-level constraints
that limit livelihoods derived from local resources.NOTES1. In many developing regions, production and consumption decision
are inseparable (Singh, Squire, & Strauss, 1986) implying that the
opportunity cost of foregone agricultural labor increases as forest labor
increases.2. Even an extremely high annual discount rate of 30% has a 5-day
equivalent discount rate of 99.6%.3. Initially, one may think that since normalization has a linear eﬀect on
any given price vector, one’s choice of normalization factors may change
the absolute values in epvg but not the ordering, which is our main interest.
However, note some candidates for pnorm rely on aggregate measures to
calculate epvg, and sample sizes and price variance diﬀer by village, so
diﬀerent normalization factors can result in diﬀerent orderings of village
revenue.4. When resources grow slow enough such that discounting should not
be ignored, pv ¼
PG
g¼1
½gvg  epvg  fvgqg1, where q is the discount factor for
the amount of time represented between cohorts.
5. For example, if all mushrooms sold for the maximum price, we would
have 100%  1 = 100%. Alternatively, consider a village where half a
village’s harvests are sorted into a low grade and half in a high grade. If
there is no price diﬀerence between grades, the village would equally
m a x i m i z e t h e i r p o t e n t i a l r e v e n u e :
50%  (p = 1) + 50%  (p = 1) = 100%. When price diﬀerences exist
and harvests are less than “perfect” we get a measure <1.
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A.1 The relationship between observable factors and mushroom
weight
A.2. A two-cohort harvest decision model
When an immature specimen is encountered in the forest,
the harvester can pick it now and receive the revenue from har-
vests pIxI where pI is the per-unit price of an immature individ-
ual xI. Harvest costs in these systems are just labor costs, and
once a resource is encountered, travel costs are sunk. If the
harvester leaves the specimen to further mature, she would re-
ceive the price for mature resources minus the cost of return-
ing pMxM  wlx, where w is the per-unit cost of labor and lx is
the marginal amount labor needed to return to individual x gi-
ven the harvester’s expected future search path. If xI is in units





Cap width 0.138 (0.036)***
Cap width2 0.004 (0.001)***
Stem width 0.979 (0.234)***




Results are from an ordinary least squares regression.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01;
132 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof mass and pI is a price per unit mass, then the maturation of
a resource can be described through the state equation
xM = xI(1 + r)/, where r is the percentage mass gained during
the maturing process. The variable / is the probability that the
specimen will still be there upon return (i.e., one minus the
probability that it is picked by someone else, eaten by animals,
etc.). If an institutional setting increases the probability that
resources grow to maturity, / can be considered a manage-
ment parameter where eﬀective management increases / and
situations with insecure harvest rights bring / closer to zero.
Although this kind of parameterization of management dra-
matically oversimpliﬁes institutional complexity, it captures
the broad issue in a meaningful way. A similar assumption
and justiﬁcation is made in Robinson et al. (2008), although
they use the discount factor as a management parameter. This
is also similar to parameters imposed by Reed (1984) and
Mendelsohn (1994) regarding land tenure insecurity.
When encountering an immature specimen in the forest, the
harvester’s problemis to
maxðpIxI ; pMxm  wlxÞ
such that xM ¼ xIð1þ rÞ/
ðA:1ÞThe necessary condition for harvesting immature stock is DI =
pIxI  [pMxI(1 + r)/  wlx] P 0 or, in terms of revenue,
RI P RM/ wlx ðA:2Þ
We can see that oDI/o/ < 0, so a harvester that is less sure a resource will
still be there upon return harvests more immature stock. Importantly, this
implies that as institutions become weaker more immature stock will be
harvested, all else equal. Additionally, oDI/olx > 0 so that the farther
one has traveled when the immature resource is encountered, the more
likely it will be picked. Even if / < 1 under perfect management, it may
be optimal to harvest some immature resources due to travel (search)
costs, but it is always optimal to harvest any mature specimen encoun-
tered. If resources die after maturing, then when a harvester encounters
mature resources the decision problem is trivially to max (pMxM, 0). Of
course, the best strategy is to harvest any mature stock one ﬁnds. This
model is suited for resources that mature quickly over time so that time-
discounting has a negligible eﬀect. For resources that mature over longer
periods, we could easily incorporate time discounting by setting the max-
imization problem in Eq. (A.1) equal to max(pIxI, q(pMxM  wlx)) where
q is the discount factor.
Taken together, this model shows that weaker management
institutions should induce the harvest of proportionally great-
er immature stock. Better management yields proportionally
greater harvests of mature stock. So, in a relative sense, open
access systems should harvest the smallest stock, common ac-
cess proportionally greater resources, and private systems the
greatest number of mature specimens.
In its setup this problem explicitly assumes there is no rela-
tionship between a specimen and the future biological produc-
tivity of the population, for which we make the case in
Section 2 for “normal” harvest practices. Here there is only
user cost attributable to foregone individual growth:
MUCi ¼ RM  wlx  RI .
We assume / is a function of total community harvest labor
L such that o//oL < 0; increased total community labor de-
creases the probability that a specimen will remain to be found
in the next period. So as L increases, / decreases and makes
picking immature stock more likely.
